The length of signal pulses is finite in practical quantum key distribution. The finite-key analysis of an unconditional quantum key distribution is a burning problem, and the efficient quantum key distribution protocol suitable for practical implementation, measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI QKD), was proposed very recently. We give the finite-key analysis of MDI QKD, which removes all detector side channels and generates many orders of key rate higher than that of full-device-independent quantum key distribution. The secure bound of the ultimate key rate is obtained under the statistical fluctuations of relative frequency, which can be applied directly to practical threshold detectors with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. The bound is evaluated for reasonable values of the observed parameters. The simulation shows that the secure distance is around 10 km when the number of sifted data is 10 10 . Moreover the secure distance would be much longer in practice because of some simplified treatments used in our paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard proposed the first quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, known as BB84 [1] . In this protocol, two parties, Alice and Bob, can generate a secure key string in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve [2, 3] . The research interest in QKD then grew quickly [4, 5] . In 1996, Mayers [6] introduced the finite-key analysis of QKD; i.e., the number of pulses sent by the communication parties is finite. Then he, cooperating with Inamori and Lütkenhaus [7] , analyzed the security of QKD in a realistic setup (highly lossy channel and non-single-photon source) after Hwang [8] gave the security analysis of the standard BB84 protocol based on a non-single-photon source by decoy method. However, König et al. [9] showed that in the previous finite-key security of the standard BB84 protocol, some potential problems exist with respect to the difference between the two information entropies (Alice and Bob versus Alice and Eve). They then proposed a universal composable security definition. The new definition indicates that the security can be judged by the distance between the ultimate secret key and the perfect key which is uniformly distributed and completely independent from the eavesdropper's quantum system. According to this modified definition of security, Cai and Scarani [10] analyzed the simplified finite-key security of the standard BB84 protocol, while some other researchers [11] [12] [13] gave the upper bounds of eavesdropper's information entropy on a secret key and the finite-key analysis under collective attack.
However, there still exists a gap between theory and experiment. Quantum hackers have exploited security loopholes in real-life quantum systems. Various attacks have been successfully launched against commercial QKD systems, for instance, time-shift attacks [14] , phase remapping attacks [15] , blinding attacks [16] , and wavelength-dependent attacks [17] . One effective approach that can resist these attacks is device-* tingting.song.china@gmail.com independent QKD (DI QKD). It is called device independent because the protocol does not need any assumptions about the internal workings of the quantum settings used in the protocol and only demands those eavesdroppers must obey the laws of quantum physics, the choice of measurement basis is free, and there is no leakage of information from Alice's and Bob's laboratories. The security of DI QKD [18] [19] [20] [21] is based on the fidelity of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs sent to two parties from an untrusted relay source, which can be detected by Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) measurements. Unfortunately, the secure key rate of DI QKD is small, on the order of 10 −10 , and the transmitted distance is around 5 km, with a lossy quantum channel. An effective method that can enlarge the secure distance needs to be established.
Recently, an approach called measurement-deviceindependent QKD (MDI QKD) has been proposed [22] . The key rate of MDI QKD is many orders of magnitude higher than that of DI QKD. In this scheme, the communication parties, say Alice and Bob, do not need to do any measurement; they only need to prepare the pulses and send them to an untrusted relay who is placed between Alice and Bob and who operates the measurement. Then, with an announcement from the relay about successful outcomes, Alice and Bob sift the data they hold and perform the standard classical postprocessing on the sifted data, such as error correction and privacy amplification. Then they obtain the secure key string. This MDI QKD protocol does not put any assumptions on the measurement device, so it can remove the side-channel attack occurring in detectors, which is more dominant than side attacks operated in other devices. In contrast to standard DI QKD, MDI QKD focuses on the signal source and assumes that Alice and Bob have almost perfect state preparation. Currently, attenuated laser pulses are used as practical sources, especially for the weak coherent source. And the security of MDI QKD based on the weak coherent source has been verified. However, for the application of MDI QKD in practice, another weakness, the asymptotic resource of optical pulses, is assumed, which cannot be satisfied in practical implementation and is not considered in Ref. [22] either.
Hence, the finite analysis of the MDI QKD protocol is a burning problem. With a finite number of pulses, the fluctuation of the parameters between the relative frequency of occurrence and the probability should be considered, which can be estimated by the law of large numbers in information theory. So the quantum de Finetti theorem and smooth entropy are used in the analysis of the final key rate. In order to get the lower bound of the key rate, we propose an optimizing model according to the relationship between the gain of signal source pulses and the yield of single-photon pulses. With the decoystate method, we can obtain the lower bound of the key rate under the statistical fluctuation for a probability distribution of pulses from different sources. The key generation rate can be evaluated for reasonable values of the observed parameters. Our simulation implies that finite decoy-state MDI QKD can transmit securely for more than 10 km when the number of successful outcome is 10 10 , which can be applied directly in practical implementation. Moreover, we believe that the theoretical model used in our paper is as general as possible for other protocols.
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the setup of MDI QKD, and Sec. III analyzes the lower bound of the secure key rate of MDI QKD in the finite instance. The simulation for reasonable values of the observed parameters is shown in Sec. IV, and the conclusion is summarized in Sec. V.
II. MEASUREMENT-DEVICE-INDEPENDENT QKD
Measurement-device-independent QKD was introduced by Lo et al. [22] . The particular steps are as follows. Two parties, Alice and Bob, prepare the sources that can emit phaserandomized weak coherent pulses (WCPs). According to the secret string they hold, each pulse is modulated with one of four BB84 polarizations and is sent to an untrusted relay located in the middle who can perform the Bell measurement. Then the relay publicly announces the result of successful outcome | − or | + when the measurement is successful. The above steps are operated for many rounds by the participants. According to all the successful outcomes, Alice and Bob postselect their data and keep the data for which not only is the outcome successful but also the bases match. We call this data sifted data. In order to guarantee that both sets of sifted data are correlated, either Alice or Bob applies a bit flip to her or his sifted data, except in the cases where both of them modulate the pulses with a diagonal basis and the relay gets a successful outcome | + . Alice and Bob choose the data which is modulated with a diagonal basis as test bits to estimate the bit error rate and the phase error rate on the remaining data (code bits). If the error rate is below the threshold value, Alice and Bob operate the error correction and privacy amplification which belong to the classical process. Otherwise, they abort the protocol. After that, the data kept by Alice and Bob are an ultimate secure key. The procedure of the MDI QKD scheme ends.
In this scheme, Alice and Bob do not require any measurement apparatus and put the detectors on the position of an untrusted relay. Hence this protocol can remove all the side channels from detectors. Furthermore, the relay is located in the middle between Alice and Bob, which is the same as the position of the relay in the EPR-based QKD protocol. For an EPR-based QKD protocol, the relay prepares the EPR state and sends each particle to Alice and Bob. So, according to the above procedure of the MDI QKD protocol, this MDI QKD corresponds to a time-reversed version of the EPR-based QKD protocol following from the Shor-Preskill proof [2] , with the assumption that both Alice and Bob receive fewer than two qubits and there is no side channel. Thus the MDI QKD protocol is secure under the assumption that Alice and Bob can correctly prepare the states. In practice, Alice and Bob can only generate WCPs. In order to ensure the security, they use a decoy state and also prepare other intensities of sources. Then, during the classical process, they select the data to be code bits, which is encoded by signal source and which can generate successful outcomes at the same time.
Other sifted data are used to estimate the error rate of code bits. After correcting the bit error and phase error of the code bits, the communication parties obtain the secure key of MDI QKD. Thus the security of MDI QKD is confirmed, although it puts some assumptions on the source compared with DI QKD. Moreover, this setup of MDI QKD locating the relay between Alice and Bob achieves two times the secure distance compared to that of the standard BB84 protocol [22] .
III. FINITE-KEY ANALYSIS OF MDI QKD
For the security of MDI QKD, we consider the corresponding quantum key distillation protocol. Assuming that Alice and Bob have shared one correlated system, the quantum key distillation protocol allows them to extract some secret key from this correlation while using only classical communication. The connection between the MDI QKD protocol and the quantum key distillation protocol can be shown according to the following observation. For each bipartite system prepared by each party, the first particle is the classical value chosen by each party, and the second particle is the quantum encoding of the corresponding classical value. Consider the following steps: (i) prepare a bipartite system
(ii) measure the first particle on a rectilinear basis or diagonal basis randomly. It is straightforward to check that the distribution of the outcome is the same as that of MDI QKD and that the remaining system contains the correct quantum encoding of the first system. The above steps are based on the assumption that both of the bit values, 0 and 1, occur with the probability 1/2. (Otherwise, the bipartite system can be | =
To illustrate these two steps in MDI QKD, we describe a new version of the MDI QKD protocol: First, both Alice and Bob prepare the states | + , keep the first particle, and send the second particle to the untrusted relay through the quantum channel. Second, the relay operates the Bell measurement and announces the positions of successful outcomes through the classical authentic channel. Third, Alice and Bob locally measure the particle they kept according to their chosen bases. Note that the entanglement shared between Alice and Bob occurs before the measurement operated by Alice and Bob and after the pulses transmitted through the quantum channel. In fact the remaining part of the MDI QKD protocol is the quantum key distillation protocol. So if the quantum key distillation protocol is secure under any preshared quantum system, the MDI QKD is also secure from any attack by eavesdroppers. Hence we can analyze the finite-key security of MDI QKD using the process of the finite-key analysis of the quantum key distillation protocol, similar to the analysis in Ref. [23] .
Finite security means that the number of pulses sent by each party is finite. Finite-key analysis should be done to the relative frequencies of the parameters, not to probabilities. So the statistical fluctuations must not be neglected. The deviation between the practical proportion and probability distribution can be deduced by the laws of large numbers in information theory. To make this intuition rigorous, we use the decoy-state method to analyze the security of MDI QKD because the decoy-state method is usually applied to estimate the secure distance of QKD in practical implementation. Next we briefly introduce the decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol. In general, each party can choose one source from three kinds of WCP sources to send pulses. We assume that the intensities of the three kinds of sources prepared by Alice and Bob are the same, and the probability distributions for choosing the sources are also the same for Alice and Bob. The three sources are the signal source s, the decoy source d, and the vacuum source ∅. Generally speaking, the intensity of the signal source s, denoted by u s , is larger than that of the decoy source d, denoted by u d . Both of them are less than 1, and the intensity of the vacuum source ∅ is zero. For each encoding bit, Alice and Bob select source s, source d, or source ∅ with its corresponding probability. Then, after being modulated with different polarization bases and transmitted to the relay, the pulses click at the detectors of the relay. All of the successful outcomes with the same bases are denoted as sifted data. Only some fraction f s of these bits of sifted data are code bits whose pulses are both sent from signal source and modulated with a rectilinear basis. The other data are used to estimate the error rate.
The number of pulses sent by each party is finite and the same, denoted as N 0 . For each pulse, Alice and Bob choose one source from the signal, decoy, and vacuum sources according to the probability distribution p s , p d , and p ∅ , respectively. N γ = N 0 × p γ is the number of pulses sent from source γ by each party. (There is no need to consider the fluctuation of this distribution because this number can be obtained directly by experiment.) Random variable x γ represents the number of photons in each pulse from source γ . Then the sequence x γ 1 ,x γ 2 , . . . ,x γ N γ is drawn to be independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a distribution P γ = (p 0γ ,p 1γ ,p 2γ , . . . ,p kγ , . . . ), where p kγ = e −u γ u k γ /k! because of the phase-randomized WCPs. The practical proportion of the photon number in pulses sent from source γ , which is different from P γ , can be assumed to be P γ = (p 0γ ,p 1γ ,p 2γ , . . . ,p n γ γ ,0, . . . ). n γ is the maximum number of photons in pulses sent from source γ . The value of p kγ for 0 k n γ is in the set {0,1/N γ ,2/N γ ,3/N γ , . . . ,1} since the number of pulses sent from source γ is N γ . Then, according to the laws of large numbers shown in Theorem 11.2.1 and Lemma 11.6.1 of Ref. [24] , the statistical fluctuation is given by the following lemma, where we correct the erratum in Refs. [10, 25] and obtain a tighter deviation than that deduced by Sano et al. [26] . Lemma 1. The practical frequency p kγ has the upper bound p kγ = min{p kγ + ξ (N γ ,n γ ),1} and the lower bound p kγ = max{p kγ − ξ (N γ ,n γ ),0}, except with the probability ε P E , where p kγ is the expected value of p kγ and ξ (N γ ,n γ ) :
Proof. See Appendix A. Lemma 1 estimates the absolute fluctuation and has no assumption on the underlying distribution. That is very suitable for estimating the fluctuation of parameters in this paper. In the following, we will give the upper bound and the lower bound of the estimated parameter λ as λ and λ, respectively. In the process of error estimation, the error rate of code bits is estimated from the testing samples, which are the fraction (1 − f s ) of the successful outcomes that both pulses sent from signal sources in rectilinear polarization. Let Y n,m,rect(diag) and e n,m,rect(diag) be the rate (called yield) and the QBER of a successful click, respectively, when Alice sends an n-photon pulse, Bob sends an m-photon pulse, and both of them modulate the pulses with the rectilinear (diagonal) bases. The gain and QBER of source γ chosen by Alice and source γ chosen by Bob are
where γ and γ belong to the set {s,d,∅} and p nγ (γ ) is also the relative frequency that one pulse sent from source γ (γ ) includes n photons in practical implementation. Hence the key rate in the finite regime is
in which f (E s,s rect ) > 1 reflects the deviation of practical errorcorrection codes from the Shannon limit,H (·) is defined as [23, 25, 27] , and ε EC and ε P A are the failure probabilities of error correction and privacy amplification, respectively. The total failure probability in the finite-key decoy-state MDI QKD model is denoted as
where n P E is the number of parameters that must be estimated and ε P E is the failure probability that we can tolerate during the practical implementation. Here, we have used a pessimistic assumption that ε P E is equal for all the estimated parameters. Although failure probabilities for estimated parameter are independent and different, this assumption is sufficient, and the practical ultimate key rate will actually be higher than what is obtained in our paper. The formula of the key rate in our paper is different from that shown in Ref. [22] 
where the parameter Q 
In fact, Y γ n,rect(diag) is the rate of the successful click (called yield) when Alice sends an n-photon pulse, Bob sends a pulse from source γ , and both of them modulate the pulses with the rectilinear (diagonal) bases. Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The equation (3) will be obtained. We emphasize that the analytic solution of the ultimate key rate does not rely on any assumption at all, and our analysis can be applied to any channels and any intensities of sources. Furthermore, one of the differences between our solutions and Ref. [13] is that we give a tighter estimation of the upper bound of error rate. Moreover, the conditions and the methods for the lower bounds of some parameters are also different since the interaction between the intensity of the signal source and that of the decoy source is different. 
IV. SIMULATION OF FINITE-KEY MDI QKD
The authors of Ref. [22] observed stable Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference between the independent laser sources, so the MDI QKD protocol is realistic. To evaluate the performance of the MDI QKD protocol in practical implementations, we consider the inefficient and noisy threshold detectors, which have the same dark count rate and detection efficiency. In our paper, the number of sifted data N is finite and fixed, which is different from the number of pulses sent by each party. We will simulate the lower bounds of the key rate under different values of N . The results are for reasonable values of the parameters [10, 22] : the loss coefficient of the quantum channel is α = 0.2 dB/km, the detection efficiency is η = 14.5%, the intrinsic error rate due to misalignment of the optical system is e c = 1.5%, the dark count rate is p dark = 6.02 × 10 −6 , the sum of all failure probabilities is ε = 10 −5 , and the failure probability of parameter estimation is ε EC = 10 −10 . Furthermore, we set the efficiency of error correction to f (E The corresponding optimal values of some parameters for different numbers of sifted data: (left) the probability of pulses sent from signal source p s , (middle) the probability of pulses sent from decoy source p d , and (right) the intensity of signal source u s . All of these parameters are optimized to the maximum key rate during simulation. The reason the lines are not smooth is that we use the discrete values of the variables to perform the simulation. If the intervals were narrower, the optimal values would be continuous.
Bob are symmetric (i.e., Q γ,γ
. We simplify the model of misalignment by putting a unitary rotation at one of the input arms of the 50:50 beam splitter and a unitary rotation at one of its output arms.
With all the practical values, we optimize other parameters to maximize the ultimate key rate for a given number N and distance l. We plot the ultimate key rate as a function of the distance between Alice and Bob, as depicted in Fig. 1 . In  Fig. 1 , we show the lower bounds of the key rate for three different values of N , i.e., N = 10 10 , N = 10 11 , and N = 10 12 . Figure 1 can be explained qualitatively as follows. The secure key rate drops significantly with increasing distance. As the number of successful outcomes gets larger, the secure distance increases. The secure distance would be fourfold longer when the number of sifted data is increased by one order. The secure distance of finite MDI-QKD is about 10 km when the number of sifted data is 10 10 . If the number of successful outcomes is smaller than 10 8 , we cannot get a nonzero secure key rate. Furthermore, finite MDI QKD with a decoy state can be realized easily in practical implementation. The value of 10 10 for the sifted data in the above simulation can be implemented by high-speed QKD systems, which can operate as fast as 10 GHz. Figure 2 shows the number of signals required by each party to obtain 10 10 sifted data for different distances. The value of N 0 grows exponentially as distance increases because the channel loss is an exponential function of the distance. If one party wants to have the same value of sifted data for different distances, he needs to prepare more pulses to resist against the channel loss, which is in accord with actual conditions. If one party gets 10 10 sifted data at 10 km, that party needs to prepare 5.08 × 10 13 signals, which can be phased in 20 min. So our results can be applied directly to practice. Now we analyze the corresponding optimal values of some parameters as a function of the distance between Alice and Bob. The results of p s , p d , and u s are shown in Fig. 3 . When the number of successful outcomes is fixed, the value of p s decreases as the secure distance increases. The reason is that many decoy pulses are needed to estimate the error rate and the yield of single-photon signal pulses for a highly lossy channel. When the secure distance is the same, the optimal value of p s increases as N increases in order to maximize the key rate. At the same time the value of p d decreases, while the optimal probability of the vacuum source is always 0.1.
(The minimum of p ∅ is set at 0.1.) That is the optimizing probability distribution of different sources. Furthermore, the intensity of signal source u s is a monotone minus function to transmission distance when the number N is fixed. Alice and Bob have to use weaker signal pulses since larger losses must be exploited by Eve to increase the mutual information. Since the intensity of the decoy source is smaller than that of the signal source, the intensity of the decoy source approaches zero. In order to analyze the key rate precisely, only the fraction of the decoy pulses selected by each party p d increases. This is another reason for p d to increase. Finally, we analyze the failure probabilities of privacy amplification and parameter estimation. We make the assumptions that the sum of failure probability is ε = 10 −5 and that the value of ε EC is 10 −10 . During the simulation, we set the values of ε P E and ε P A , with one varying from 10 −10 to 10 −6 and the other satisfying Eq. (4). The optimizing value of the failure probability of parameter estimation ε P E is 10 −7 , while ε P A is 10 −10 . We compare the key rate of finite MDI QKD and that of the finite BB84 protocol in Fig. 4 . For the BB84 protocol, we simulate two cases: one case where the number of sifted data is fixed at 10 10 and another where the number of clicks is 10 10 . The ultimate key rate for the second case is a half to a third of the ultimate key rate for the first case when the distance is the same. For finite MDI QKD, we simulate the key rate when the number of sifted data is 10 10 . We use N MDI and N BB84 to denote the number of sifted data kept by each party in the finite MDI QKD protocol and in the finite BB84 protocol, respectively. So for finite MDI QKD, N MDI is equal rate of finite MDI QKD is of the order of 10 −5 , while that of the standard BB84 protocol is of the order of 10 −2 . The secure distance of the MDI QKD scheme is about 10 km, shorter than that of the standard finite decoy-state BB84 protocol [13] . We may expect that finite MDI QKD can achieve almost twice the distance of the finite standard BB84 protocol since MDI QKD achieves almost twice the distance of the standard BB84 protocol. But the simulation result does not follow this intuition. Besides the assumptions for the intensities of the signal and decoy sources being different for both analyses, the most likely reason is that the ratios of sequences generated to ultimate key in sifted data are different. In finite MDI QKD, the sifted data whose pulses are both sent from signal sources could be code bits, after Bob follows the announcement about the kinds of sources chosen by Alice. Second, corresponding to the formula of the ultimate key rate, a factor of p 2 s for finite MDI QKD exists, whereas the finite standard BB84 has the coefficient p s . However, for the infinite scenario, neither of them needs to consider the fractions. Thus the fractions overwhelm the advantage that we obtain from putting the relay between Alice and Bob. For all these reasons, the bound of finite MDI QKD is lower than the finite standard BB84 protocol. Positively, the secure distance increases quickly as the number of sifted data increases. As mentioned above, the secure distance for N = 10 11 is about five times farther than that for N = 10 10 . Above all, we give one method to analyze the security of finite MDI QKD, which considers the statistical fluctuations and removes all the side channels on the detectors. So this ultimate key rate can be applied directly in practice.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, we give the finite-key analysis of measurement-device-independent QKD without any assumption on detectors. The secure bound of the ultimate key rate is obtained under the statistical fluctuations, which can be applied directly to practical threshold detectors with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. Finally, the bound is evaluated for reasonable values of the observed parameters. Compared with the key rate of the standard BB84 protocol with a finite number of pulses, the results of finite MDI QKD can be applied directly in experiment. Figure 4 implies that the lower bound of the ultimate key rate given in this paper is not stringent. Generally speaking, the optimal values are continuous for different distances, but it would require much time to do the simulation. So the discrete jumps of optimal parameters exists in Fig. 3 , and a more stringent security bound and the general theory of decoy-state MDI QKD will be the subject of our future work. Furthermore, the authors of Ref. [28] give the MDI QKD with a basis-dependent flaw in the context of phase encoding schemes because of the discrepancy in the density matrices corresponding to the two bases in BB84 states and the time-dependent birefringence effect in the optical fiber. The problem can be generalized much further for finite MDI QKD. 
APPENDIX A: THE DEVIATION OF p kγ
The number of pulses is N γ , which are sent from source γ . For each pulse, random variable x γ is denoted as the number of photons, and its value is chosen from the set {0,1,2, . . . }. Then a sequence x γ 1 ,x γ 2 , . . . ,x γ N γ is drawn i.i.d. according to a distribution P γ , which is related to the intensity of source γ . P γ is the relative proportion of occurrences of each element in set {0,1,2, . . . n γ }. P N γ is used to denote the set of types of proportions. So we have the following propositions, and the previous proposition can deduce the next one.
Proposition 1 (Theorem 11.1.1 of Ref. [24] ). |P N γ | (N γ + 1) n γ . Proposition 2 (Theorem 11.1.2 of Ref. [24] ). The probability of x γ depends only on its type and is given by P
Proposition 3 (Theorem 11.1.3 of Ref. [24] ). T (P γ ) is the sequence class with type P γ . Thus we can give the size of T (P γ ) for any type P γ ∈ P N γ , that is,
|T (P γ )| 2 N γ H (P γ ) . Proposition 4 (Theorem 11.1.4 of Ref. [24] ). The probability of type class T (P γ ) under P 
